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NRMP-like market: before interviews

Run this market yourself

A saved run of the simulator: everyone who opens it sees this same market. Simulated from the assumptions in the parameters; not a prediction of any real applicant's or program's match.

Applicant agreement
0.605
how alike applicants' true preferences are
Program agreement
0.701
how alike programs' true preferences are
Applicants' fidelity
0.895
true against pre-interview view
Programs' fidelity
0.894
true against pre-interview view

Before interviews

Agreement is the average correlation between two agents' true utilities (1 = everyone agrees). Fidelity is how well the pre-interview view matches the truth: the correlation of true and observed utilities over all pairs, and each agent's rank correlation between its true and its pre-interview ordering.

MeasureApplicants rating programsPrograms rating applicants
Agreement (true utilities)0.6050.701
Agreement (true rankings, Spearman)0.5780.689
Agreement (pre-interview views)0.4840.561
Pre-interview noise (SD)0.5000.500
Fidelity, expected0.8940.894
Fidelity, realised (all pairs)0.8950.894
Fidelity per agent (mean Spearman)0.8830.886
Distinct first choices5854
Share whose first choice is the most popular0.2680.197
Share whose first choice is in the top 100.7910.655
Agents with a taste term1,000142
How well does each applicant know their true order?

How well does each applicant know their true order?

For each applicant, the rank correlation (Spearman) between their true ordering of every program and their view of it before interviews. 1 is a perfect view; values near 0 mean the pre-interview view says little about the truth. The spread shows how unevenly information falls among applicants. Before interviews only: interviews reveal more, as the Applications and interviews tab shows.

Learn more in the help

Applicants' pre-interview fidelity: 1,000 applicants in 20 bins from 0.8117 to 0.9385; the fullest bin holds 145.

The numbers
FromToCount
0.8117 0.8180 1
0.8180 0.8244 2
0.8244 0.8307 5
0.8307 0.8371 4
0.8371 0.8434 14
0.8434 0.8497 14
0.8497 0.8561 41
0.8561 0.8624 63
0.8624 0.8688 74
0.8688 0.8751 104
0.8751 0.8815 133
0.8815 0.8878 145
0.8878 0.8941 123
0.8941 0.9005 107
0.9005 0.9068 84
0.9068 0.9132 47
0.9132 0.9195 28
0.9195 0.9259 10
0.9259 0.9322 0
0.9322 0.9385 1
How well does each program know its true order?

How well does each program know its true order?

For each program, the rank correlation (Spearman) between its true ordering of every applicant and its view of it before interviews. 1 is a perfect view; values near 0 mean the pre-interview view says little about the truth. Before interviews only: interviews reveal more, as the Applications and interviews tab shows.

Learn more in the help

Programs' pre-interview fidelity: 142 programs in 20 bins from 0.8662 to 0.9008; the fullest bin holds 19.

The numbers
FromToCount
0.8662 0.8679 1
0.8679 0.8696 0
0.8696 0.8714 0
0.8714 0.8731 2
0.8731 0.8748 2
0.8748 0.8765 3
0.8765 0.8783 8
0.8783 0.8800 12
0.8800 0.8817 5
0.8817 0.8835 19
0.8835 0.8852 15
0.8852 0.8869 18
0.8869 0.8887 13
0.8887 0.8904 10
0.8904 0.8921 8
0.8921 0.8939 11
0.8939 0.8956 8
0.8956 0.8973 3
0.8973 0.8991 2
0.8991 0.9008 2
How accurately do applicants see programs?

How accurately do applicants see programs?

True against observed utility for a sample of applicant–program pairs: before interviews, the true utility against the pre-interview view; after interviews, for a sample of interviews, the realised utility against the view after the interview. Points on the dashed line are seen exactly; the wider the cloud around it, the noisier the view. The summary gives each cloud's correlation. A sample of at most 1,500 points per series, the same on every visit (drawn from the run's seed).

Learn more in the help

True against observed utility, applicants' views of programs: 1,500 sampled pairs before interviews (correlation 0.896) and 1,500 sampled interviews after them, realised utility against the post-interview view (correlation 0.981).

How accurately do programs see applicants?

How accurately do programs see applicants?

True against observed utility for a sample of program–applicant pairs, before interviews and (for a sample of interviews) after them. Points on the dashed line are seen exactly; the wider the cloud around it, the noisier the view. The summary gives each cloud's correlation. A sample of at most 1,500 points per series, the same on every visit (drawn from the run's seed).

Learn more in the help

True against observed utility, programs' views of applicants: 1,500 sampled pairs before interviews (correlation 0.896) and 1,500 sampled interviews after them, realised utility against the post-interview view (correlation 0.979).

Is demand concentrated on a few programs?

Is demand concentrated on a few programs?

How many applicants rank each program first before interviews, most wanted first, with each program's number of positions as a mark. Bars far above their mark are programs many more applicants want than they can take. With many programs, zoom with the slider under the chart. First choices before interviews, not the final rank order lists.

Learn more in the help

First-choice demand: 58 of 142 programs are some applicant's first choice before interviews; the most wanted tenth of programs gets 84.6% of first choices (Gini 0.906).

The numbers
The 10 most wanted programs
ProgramRank it firstPositions
Program 402685
Program 1022254
Program 62685
Program 5644
Program 64494
Program 9316
Program 1162710
Program 74254
Program 134199
Program 251511
How unequal is first-choice demand?

How unequal is first-choice demand?

The Lorenz curve of first-choice demand: programs from the least to the most wanted, against their cumulative share of first choices. The dashed diagonal is equal demand; the further the curve sags below it, the more concentrated demand is. The Gini coefficient in the summary is twice the area between them (0 = equal, 1 = everyone wants the same program).

Learn more in the help

The Lorenz curve of first-choice demand: programs from the least to the most wanted against their cumulative share of first choices; the dashed diagonal is equal demand, and the Gini coefficient (0.906) is twice the area between them.